Bugs in the proofs of revelation principle by Wu, Haoyang
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Bugs in the proofs of revelation principle
Haoyang Wu
Wan-Dou-Miao Research Lab, Suite 1002, 790 WuYi Road,
Shanghai, China.
19. August 2010
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/31311/
MPRA Paper No. 31311, posted 7. June 2011 10:32 UTC
Bugs in the proofs of revelation principle
Haoyang Wu ∗
Wan-Dou-Miao Research Lab, Suite 1002, 790 WuYi Road,
Shanghai, 200051, China.
Abstract
In the field of mechanism design, the revelation principle has been known for
decades. Myerson, Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green gave formal proofs of the rev-
elation principle respectively. However, in this paper, I argue that there are bugs
hidden in their proofs.
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The revelation principle is well-known in the economics literature. See Page
884, Line 24 [1]: “The implication of the revelation principle is ... to identify
the set of implementable social choice functions, we need only identify those
that are truthfully implementable.” But, in this paper I will argue that there
are bugs in the proofs given by Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green [1] and My-
erson [2] respectively. Coincidentally, the bugs are relevant to the same word
“imply”. Related definitions and proofs are given in Appendices, which are
cited from Section 8.E, 23.B and 23.D [1] and Ref. [2]. Two remarks are added
in Appendix 1 and 3 respectively.
1 The bug in the proof by Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green
Here, the notation is referred to Ref. [1]. See the proof of Proposition 23.D.1:“...
Condition (23.D.2) implies that for all i and all θi ∈ Θi,...”. To derive formula
(23.D.3), the term “sˆi” (∀sˆi ∈ Si, i = 1, · · · , I) in formula (23.D.2) is replaced
by “s∗i (θˆi)” (∀θˆi ∈ Θi, i = 1, · · · , I). Since formula (23.D.2) holds for all
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sˆi ∈ Si, it looks straightforward to do so at first sight. However, in what
follows I will argue that this “straightforward” implication does not hold.
First, note that both formula (23.D.2) and (23.D.3) correspond to the same
indirect mechanism Γ = (S1, · · · , SI , g(·)) given in Proposition 23.D.1. The
reason is that these two formulas are based on the same outcome function
g(·), and after formula (23.D.3) the condition g(s∗(θ)) = f(θ) (for all θ ∈ Θ)
also comes from the indirect mechanism Γ.
Next, by the definition of a pure strategy for player i in a Bayesian game
(see Appendix 1, Paragraph 2), the legal input of the function s∗i (·) should be
some realized type of agent i (see Remark 1). Put differently, it is illegal to
put anything that is not the realized type of agent i into the function s∗i (·).
Now consider the right part of formula (23.D.3),Eθ−i [ui(g(s
∗
i (θˆi), s
∗
−i(θ−i)), θi)|θi].
According to Proposition 8.E.1, the expectation is taken over realizations of
the other players’ random types conditional on player i’s realized type θi. Given
that agent i’s type has been realized as θi, none of θˆi (∀θˆi ∈ Θi, θˆi 6= θi) can
be agent i’s realized type. Therefore, in formula (23.D.3), the term “s∗i (θˆi)”
(∀θˆi ∈ Θi, θˆi 6= θi) is actually illegal, which means the formula (23.D.3) is il-
legal. Hence, the aforementioned “straightforward” implication does not hold.
That is the bug.
One may think the variable θˆi in formula (23.D.3) can be agent i’s announced
type in a direct mechanism, and so can be different from the realized type θi.
But as shown before, the mechanism corresponding to formula (23.D.3) is the
indirect mechanism Γ given in Proposition 23.D.1, not a direct mechanism. It
is illegal to let agent i directly announce a type in the Bayesian game induced
by such indirect mechanism Γ.
2 The bug in the proof by Myerson
Here, the notation is referred to Ref. [2]. See the proof of Theorem 2: “...
Furthermore, the equilibrium inequalities (14) for pi imply the incentive com-
patible inequalities (6) for pi′...”. Let us consider the right part of the incentive
compatible inequalities (6) for pi′. For all i, ai ∈ Ai, bi ∈ Ai,
Zi(pi
′, bi|ai) =
∑
α∈A1×···×An
∑
c∈C
Pi(α|ai)pi′(c|α−i, bi)Ui(c, α)
=
∑
α∈A1×···×An
∑
s∈S1×···×Sn
∑
c∈C
Pi(α|ai) · pi(c|s)
· [
n∏
j=1,j 6=i
σj(sj|αj)× σi(si|bi)] · Ui(c, α)
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As specified in the left term “Zi(pi
′, bi|ai)”, agent i’s type is realized as ai.
Therefore, according to Remark 2, the term “σi(si|bi)” (for all bi ∈ Ai, bi 6= ai)
is actually illegal. Put differently, the incentive compatible inequalities (6) for
pi′ is illegal. That is the bug.
Appendix 1: Definitions and proof in Section 8.E [1]
According to page 255 [1], formally, in a Bayesian game, each player i has a
payoff function ui(si, s−i, θi), where θi ∈ Θi is a random variable chosen by
nature that is observed only by player i. The joint probability distribution of
the θi’s is given by F (θ1, · · · , θI), which is assumed to be common knowledge
among the players. Letting Θ = Θ1×· · ·×ΘI , a Bayesian game is summarized
by [I, {Si}, {ui(·)},Θ, F (·)].
A pure strategy for player i in a Bayesian game is a function si(θi), or decision
rule, that gives the player’s strategy choice for each realization of his type
θi. Player i’s pure strategy set Si is therefore the set of all such functions.
Player i’s expected payoff given a profile of pure strategies for the I players
(s1(·), · · · , sI(·)) is then given by:
u˜i(s1(·), · · · , sI(·)) = Eθ[ui(s1(θ1), · · · , sI(θI), θi)], (8.E.1)
********************************************************************
Remark 1: Following page 148 [3], the timing of a static Bayesian game is as
follows:
Step 1: Nature chooses a type vector θ = (θ¯1, · · · , θ¯I), where θ¯i is the realized
type of agent i;
Step 2: Nature reveals θ¯i to player i but not to any other player;
Step 3: The players simultaneously output (s1(θ¯1), · · · , sI(θ¯I));
Step 4: Each player i receives the payoff ui(s1(θ¯1), · · · , sI(θ¯I), θ¯i).
For each player i = 1, · · · , I, consider his strategy function si(·), then:
1) si(·) is chosen (or controlled) by player i, and is his private information;
2) In a static Bayesian game, player i’s type can be realized as any element of
Θi. The realized type of player i is his private information;
3) The legal input parameter of si(·) must be some realized type θ¯i in Θi, and
the output of si(·) is si(θ¯i) which is observable to the outside agent (either
principal or mediator).
4) Suppose player i’s type has been realized as θ¯i in Step 1, then in Step 3, it
is illegal to let player i output si(θi) for any θi ∈ Θi, θi 6= θ¯i.
********************************************************************
Definition 8.E.1: A (pure strategy) Bayesian Nash equilibrium for the Bayesian
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game [I, {Si}, {ui(·)},Θ, F (·)] is a profile of decision rules (s1(·), · · · , sI(·))
that constitutes a Nash equilibrium of game ΓN = [I, {S }, {u˜i(·)}]. That is,
for every i = 1, · · · , I,
u˜i(si(·), s−i(·)) ≥ u˜i(s′i(·), s−i(·))
for all s′i(·) ∈ Si, where u˜i(si(·), s−i(·)) is defined as in Eq(8.E.1).
A very useful point to note is that in a (pure strategy) Bayesian Nash equi-
librium each player must be playing a best response to the conditional distri-
bution of his opponents’ strategies for each type that he might end up having.
Proposition 8.E.1 provides a more formal statement of this point.
Proposition 8.E.1: A profile of decision rules (s1(·), · · · , sI(·)) is a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium in Bayesian game [I, {Si}, {ui(·)},Θ, F (·)] if and only if, for
all i and all θ¯i ∈ Θi occurring with positive probability,
Eθ−i [ui(si(θ¯i), s−i(θ−i), θ¯i)|θ¯i)] ≥ Eθ−i [ui(s′i, s−i(θ−i), θ¯i)|θ¯i)], (8.E.2)
for all s′i ∈ Si, where the expectation is taken over realizations of the other
players’ random variables conditional on player i’s realization of his signal θ¯i.
Proof : For necessity, note that if Eq(8.E.2) did not hold for some player i
for some θ¯i ∈ Θi that occurs with positive probability, then player i could
do better by changing his strategy choice in the event he gets realization θ¯i,
contradicting (s1(·), · · · , sI(·)) being a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. In the other
direction, if condition Eq(8.E.2) holds for all θ¯i ∈ Θi occurring with positive
probability, then player i cannot improve on the payoff he receives by playing
strategy si(·). ¤
Appendix 2: Definitions and proof in Section 23.B and 23.D [1]
(P858) Consider a setting with I agents, indexed by i = 1, · · · , I. These
agents make a collective choice from some set X of possible alternatives. Prior
to the choice, each agent i privately observes his type θi that determines his
preferences. The set of possible types for agent i is denoted as Θi. The vector
of agents’ types θ = (θ1, · · · , θI) is drawn from set Θ = Θ1×· · ·×ΘI according
to probability density φ(·). Each agent i’s Bernoulli utility function when he
is of type θi is ui(x, θi).
Definition 23.B.1: A social choice function is a function f : Θ1×· · ·×ΘI →
X that, for each possible profile of the agents’ types (θ1, · · · , θI), assigns a
collective choice f(θ1, · · · , θI) ∈ X.
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Definition 23.B.3: A mechanism Γ = (S1, · · · , SI , g(·)) is a collection of I
strategy sets S1, · · · , SI and an outcome function g : S1 × · · · × SI → X.
Definition 23.B.4: The mechanism Γ = (S1, · · · , SI , g(·)) implements social
choice function f(·) if there is an equilibrium strategy profile (s∗1(·), · · · , s∗I(·))
of the game induced by Γ such that g(s∗1(θ1), · · · , s∗I(θI)) = f(θ1, · · · , θI) for
all (θ1, · · · , θI) ∈ Θ1, · · · ,ΘI .
Definition 23.B.5: A direct revelation mechanism is a mechanism in which
Si = Θi for all i and g(θ) = f(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ1 × · · · ×ΘI .
Definition 23.B.6: The social choice function f(·) is truthfully implementable
(or incentive compatible) if the direct revelation mechanism Γ = (S1, · · · , SI , f(·))
has an equilibrium (s∗1(·), · · · , s∗I(·)) in which s∗i (θi) = θi for all θi ∈ Θi and all
i = 1, · · · , I; that is, if truth telling by each agent i constitutes an equilibrium
of Γ = (S1, · · · , SI , f(·)).
Definition 23.D.1: The strategy profile s∗(·) = (s∗1(·), · · · , s∗I(·)) is a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium of mechanism Γ = (S1, · · · , SI , g(·)) if, for all i and all
θi ∈ Θi,
Eθ−i [ui(g(s
∗
i (θi), s
∗
−i(θ−i)), θi)|θi] ≥ Eθ−i [ui(g(sˆi, s∗−i(θ−i)), θi)|θi]
for all sˆi ∈ Si.
Definition 23.D.2: The mechanism Γ = (S1, · · · , SI , g(·)) implements the
social choice function f(·) in Bayesian Nash equilibrium if there is a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium of Γ, s∗(·) = (s∗1(·), · · · , s∗I(·)), such that g(s∗(θ)) = f(θ) for
all θ ∈ Θ.
Definition 23.D.3: The social choice function f(·) is truthfully implementable
in Bayesian Nash equilibrium if s∗i (θi) = θi (for all θi ∈ Θi and i = 1, · · · , I) is a
Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the direct revelation mechanism Γ = (Θ1, · · · ,ΘI , f(·)).
That is, if for all i = 1, · · · , I and all θi ∈ Θi,
Eθ−i [ui(f(θi, θ−i)), θi)|θi] ≥ Eθ−i [ui(f(θˆi, θ−i), θi)|θi], (23.D.1)
for all θˆi ∈ Θi.
Proposition 23.D.1 (The Revelation Principle for Bayesian Nash Equilib-
rium) Suppose that there exists a mechanism Γ = (S1, · · · , SI , g(·)) that im-
plements the social choice function f(·) in Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Then
f(·) is truthfully implementable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Proof : Since Γ = (S1, · · · , SI , g(·)) implements f(·) in Bayesian Nash equi-
librium, then there exists a profile of strategies s∗(·) = (s∗1(·), · · · , s∗I(·)) such
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that g(s∗(θ)) = f(θ) for all θ, and for all i and all θi ∈ Θi,
Eθ−i [ui(g(s
∗
i (θi), s
∗
−i(θ−i)), θi)|θi] ≥ Eθ−i [ui(g(sˆi, s∗−i(θ−i)), θi)|θi], (23.D.2)
for all sˆi ∈ Si. Condition (23.D.2) implies that for all i and all θi ∈ Θi,
Eθ−i [ui(g(s
∗
i (θi), s
∗
−i(θ−i)), θi)|θi] ≥ Eθ−i [ui(g(s∗i (θˆi), s∗−i(θ−i)), θi)|θi], (23.D.3)
for all θˆi ∈ Θi. Since g(s∗(θ)) = f(θ) for all θ, (23.D.3) means that, for all i
and all θi ∈ Θi,
Eθ−i [ui(f(θi, θ−i), θi)|θi] ≥ Eθ−i [ui(f(θˆi, θ−i), θi)|θi], (23.D.4)
for all θˆi ∈ Θi. But, this is precisely condition (23.D.1), the condition for f(·)
to be truthfully implementable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Q.E.D.
Appendix 3: Definitions and proof in Ref. [2]
The arbitrator’s problem is described by a Bayesian collective choice problem,
an object of the form:
(C,A1, A2, · · · , An, U1, U2, · · · , Un, P ), (1)
The individual members of the group, or players, are numbered 1, 2, · · · , n.
C is the set of choices available to the group. For each player i, Ai is the set
of possible types for player i. Each Ui : C × A1 × · · · × An 7→ R is a utility
function such that each Ui(c, a1, · · · , an) is the payoff which player i would get
if c ∈ C were chosen and if (a1, · · · , an) were the true vector of player types.
P is a probability distribution on A1×· · ·×An such that P (a1, · · · , an) is the
probability, as judged by the arbitrator, that (a1, · · · , an) is the true vector of
types for the n players.
For some collection of response sets S1, · · · , Sn, a choice mechanism is defined
as a real-valued function pi with a domain of the form C× (S1×· · ·×Sn) such
that: ∑
c′∈C
pi(c′|s1, · · · , sn) = 1, and pi(c|s1, · · · , sn) ≥ 0 for all c, (2)
for every (s1, · · · , sn) ∈ S1 × · · · × Sn.
Given a choice mechanism pi, for any player i and for any ai ∈ Ai and bi ∈ Ai,
let:
Zi(pi, bi|ai) =
∑
α∈A1×···×An
∑
c∈C
Pi(α|ai)pi(c|α−i, bi)Ui(c, α), (5)
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where (α−i, bi) = (α1, · · · , αi−1, bi, αi+1, · · · , αn), Pi(α|ai) = 0 if αi 6= ai.
Zi(pi, bi|ai) is the conditionally-expected utility payoff for player i, given that
his type is ai, if he says that his type is bi when pi is the choice mechanism
and when all other players are expected to tell the truth.
A choice mechanism pi using the standard response sets is said to be Bayesian
incentive compatible if
Zi(pi, ai|ai) ≥ Zi(pi, bi|ai), for all i, ai ∈ Ai, bi ∈ Ai, (6)
If choice mechanism pi is used and if everyone is honest, then player i’s
conditionally-expected payoff when he knows ai is:
Vi(pi|ai) = Zi(pi, ai|ai), (7)
The allocation of conditionally-expected payoffs associated with mechanism pi
is the vector:
V(pi) = (((Vi(pi|ai))ai∈Ai)ni=1). (8)
This is a vector of
∑n
i=1 |Ai| real numbers, indexed on the disjoint union of the
Ai sets. If the arbitrator could use any choice mechanism and expect honest
responses, then we would define the feasible set of expected allocation vectors
to be:
F = {V(pi) : pi is a choice mechanism}.
The set of incentive-feasible expected allocation vectors is defined to be:
F ∗ = {V(pi) : pi is Bayesian incentive compatible}.
A response plan for player i is a function σi mapping each type ai ∈ Ai onto
a probability distribution over his response set Si. That is, if σi is player
i’s response plan, then σi(si|ai) is the probability that player i will tell the
arbitrator si if his true type is ai.
********************************************************************
Remark 2: Like Remark 1, I list the timing of a static Bayesian game as fol-
lows:
Step 1: Nature chooses a type vector (a¯1, · · · , a¯n), where a¯i is the realized type
of agent i;
Step 2: Nature reveals a¯i to player i but not to any other player;
Step 3: Player i tells his response si to the arbitrator according to the proba-
bility σi(si|a¯i). All players tell the arbitrator simultaneously.
Step 4: The arbitrator assigns choice c to all players according to the proba-
bility pi(c|s1, · · · , sn).
Step 5: Each player i receives the payoff Ui(c, a¯1, · · · , a¯n).
For each player i = 1, · · · , n, consider his response plan σi(si|·), then:
1) σi(si|·) is chosen (or controlled) by player i, and is his private information;
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2) In a static Bayesian game, player i’s type can be realized as any element of
Ai. The realized type of player i is his private information;
3) The legal input parameter of σi(si|·) must be some realized type a¯i in Ai,
and the output of σi(si|·) is the probability that player i will tell the arbitrator
si if his realized type is a¯i.
4) Suppose player i’s type has been realized as a¯i in Step 1, then in Step 3, it is
illegal to let player i act using another response plan σi(si|bi) for any bi ∈ Ai,
bi 6= a¯i.
********************************************************************
If (σ1, · · · , σn) lists the players’ response plans for the choice mechanism pi,
and if player i knows that ai is his true type, then player i’s expected utility
payoff is:
Wi(pi, σ1, · · · , σn|ai) =
∑
α∈A1×···×An
∑
s∈S1×···×Sn
∑
c∈C
Pi(α|ai)
· (
n∏
j=1
σj(sj|aj)) · pi(c|s) · Ui(c, α). (12)
The vector of conditionally-expected payoffs generated by (σ1, · · · , σn) is:
W(pi, σ1, · · · , σn) = (((Wi(pi, σ1, · · · , σn|ai))ai∈Ai)ni=1). (13)
This is a vector with
∑n
i=1 |Ai| components, indexed on the disjoint union of the
Ai sets, like the V(pi). We say that (σ1, · · · , σn) is a response-plan equilibrium
for the choice mechanism pi if, for any player i and type ai ∈ Ai, for every
possible alternative response plan σ′i for player i:
Wi(pi, σ1, · · · , σn|ai) ≥ Wi(pi, σ1, · · · , σi−1, σ′i, σi+1, · · · , σn|ai). (14)
The set of equilibrium-feasible expected allocation vectors is defined to be:
F ∗∗ = {W(pi, σ1, · · · , σn) : pi is a choice mechanism, and
(σ1, · · · , σn) is a response-plan equilibrium for pi}. (15)
Theorem 2: F ∗∗ = F ∗.
Proof : If (σ1, · · · , σn) is a response-plan equilibrium for a mechanism pi on
S1, · · · , Sn, then we can define an equivalent choice mechanism pi′ onA1, · · · , An
by:
pi′(c|α) = ∑
s∈S1×···×Sn
pi(c|s) · (
n∏
i=1
σi(si|αi)).
It is easy to check that V(pi′) =W(pi, σ1, · · · , σn), so that the allocations gen-
erated are the same. Furthermore, the equilibrium inequalities (14) for pi imply
the incentive compatible inequalities (6) for pi′. Thus x =W(pi, σ1, · · · , σn) ∈
F ∗∗ implies x = V(pi′) ∈ F ∗. So F ∗∗ ⊆ F ∗. I omit the rest of proof.
Q.E.D.
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